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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 04/01/2008 Accident number: 458 
Accident time: 12:00 Accident Date: 07/03/2004 
Where it occurred: MF ID 11161, 
Podhum, Mostar 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Victim inattention (?) Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Victim inattention Date of main report: 17/03/2004 
ID original source: None Name of source: BHMAC WL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast Ground condition: leaf litter 
rocks/stones 
wet 
woodland 
Date record created: 04/01/2008 Date  last modified: 04/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
 
Accident report 
This report was made available in 2006 and translated in 2007 specifically for entry to the 
DDAS. The translated report has been edited for anonymity and is summarised below. 
Based on an initial report delivered to BHMAC by the demining organisation on the 7th of 
March 2004 at 16:09, the director of BHMAC formed an investigative committee with the 
following members:[Name removed] (presiding), Ms [Name removed], and [Name removed]. 
This committee created a report which is the main information source for the DDAS. Another 
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document from BHMAC was available: “Lessons Learned from the Demining Accident on 7 
March 2004”, dated 17 March 2004, the same date as the accident report, signed by the 
BHMAC director, [Name removed]. This second document contains no new information and it 
adopts the recommendations of the investigative committee. 
 
Conditions at the site 
Due to bad weather conditions, the investigation was conducted on 10th March 2004, three 
days after the accident.  
The minefield (ID 11161) is in Podhum, a suburb of the town of Mostar. It is two km from the 
town centre, below a hill named “Hum”, just above the houses in Podhum. The eastern border 
is a demined area (ID 10060), the western border is a suburb Panjevina. There were no 
available minefield records.  The terrain is on a hillside, partially stony and partially grown with 
dry grass and bushes, there are some trees. There are visible traces of burning from the 
years before. The soil is clay mixed with stones and dry leaves. At the time of accident, the 
surface was soft due to rain, but inadequate for prodding, because of the stones and the thin 
layer of soil, below which there is only stone. The temperature was 15 degrees. Animals and 
previous fires had activated some mines in the past.  
 
[The worksite was very steep through light woodland and over rocks.] 
 
The work-site layout and marking  
The work-site had been properly marked.  
 
Supervision and discipline on the work-site  
The team leader of team 1 in the organisation VILAKOL is [Name removed]. The next level of 
supervision was done by the work-site leader [Name removed], who organised and conducted 
the work. Internal quality control was conducted by [Name removed] every five days, 
according to the National Standard. An additional monitor,[Name removed], from the 
monitoring organisation [Other organisation] was present all the time. The work was well 
organised with the necessary discipline. All regulations (distance between deminers, working 
time...) were correctly followed.  
 
Quality assurance 
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Some irregularities had been recorded by the officer for QA/QC from BHMAC, which was 
conducted by an officer from RU Mostar. Some intolerable critical mistakes had occurred and 
a particular area could not pass the inspection. During the same visit, it was established that 
some visors were not adequate and should be immediately changed. The deminers had no 
contract with the demining organisation, but they had it on the next day. By the next visit of 
the BHMAC inspection, 6 March 2004, it has been established that the undergrowth removal 
was not entirely regular, which was corrected. An area of 42 m2 was checked and there were 
no critical mistakes. Another irregularity was that many signals in the designated safe path (2-
3 per m2) were not investigated.  
 
Communication and connections 
The communications satisfy the National Standard, mostly by using mobile telephones. After 
receiving first aid, the injured deminer was transported to the hospital in Mostar, which is 1.5 
km from the work-site.  
 
The accident and the medical support  
The medical support was appropriate (equipment, vehicle and personnel). Deminer [Name 
removed] gave first aid to the injured deminer [the Victim].  
[The Victim] was going away from the lane. At about 10 m distance from [Name removed], 
who approached the base line, he slipped with his left foot below the tape into a non-
examined part of the minefield and activated a PMA-3. The working path was narrower there 
because of a larger rock. After the explosion, [the Victim] fell into the working path, but with 
his legs lying in the non-examined part. Deminer [Name removed] pulled him out into the 
cleared part. The tip of the left shoe was damaged. It was taken off.  
 
[The Victim’s right boot.] 
Since the bleeding was not strong and the injured deminer could lean upon his leg, he walked 
with the help of [Name removed] towards the medical vehicle already approaching them. The 
paramedic established an injury of the left toe, a smaller injury above the upper lip and a 
small injury on the deminer’s upper leg. The injuries were later described as light. After he 
received the first aid, he was taken to the Mostar hospital. The ride took 3 minutes. [The 
Victim] was sent home and proscribed rest and some medications. His hearing was checked 
4-5 days later (results not available). He was insured according to the National Standard.  
 
PPE and tools 
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The Victim’s equipment was: Metal-detector, prodder, a small shovel, shears, secateurs, a 
small saw, hammer, helmet with a visor [no helmet, long visor] and a frag jacket [frontal 
apron]; satisfying the National Standard for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The metal detector 
(Vallon VMH-1) was functional and its performance satisfied the Standard (UPMAH-3 
detonator detectable at 10 cm [presumably in air]). 
 
[The victim’s PPE at the site. Showing no marks at all.] 
 
The mine 
A PMA-3 was about 28 cm from the centre of the tape [parts were found and photographed]. 
There was a stone on the mine, which probably activated it. The main power of the blast was 
directed to a nearby tree, which was quite damaged.  
 
[The seat of the explosion and the damaged tree.] 
This implies that the position of the mine was tilted sideways, following the slope of the hill. It 
might have been placed horizontally and been moved with time. There was no crater: the 
mine was not buried in the ground, it was just masked with some soil, leaves and a stone. 
This conclusion is confirmed by some signs of burning.  
 
Recommendations of the investigative committee 
It is recommended to perform regular additional training of deminers. All signals should be 
investigated – if not possible with a prodder, than they have to be excavated. It is 
recommended to use magnets to pick up metal fragments. More attention should be paid to 
internal quality control, especially by the team leader, who should return the deminers to clear 
the area in case of errors.  
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 Conclusion 
The cause of the accident: lack of care of a deminer. He slipped on a narrow path and 
activated PMA-3.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 605 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apon, Long 
visor (worn raised) ? 
 
Summary of injuries: 
minor Face 
minor Foot 
minor Hearing 
minor Leg 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Victim inattention” because it seems that the 
Victim slipped and his foot moved outside the cleared area. The secondary cause is listed as 
“unavoidable” because accidental loss of balance is probably inevitable, especially when 
working on steep slopes in woodland. The fact that the “safe” area had not been cleared of 
metal raises some concerns about the management of the site. The fact that the area was 
wet and with leaf litter raises questions about the safety of working when wet and the quality 
of the boots issued to the victim. The investigators might have considered the potential for 
using “leaf-rakes” (used elsewhere) to remove leaf-litter. 
The Victim’s face injury makes it likely that the Victim’s visor was not worn or was worn 
raised. The cleanliness of the PPE shown in the photograph suggests that it may not been 
worn at the time. 
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